‘A symptom of a greater issue’ - What the fall of the Assad regime means for Syrian nationals in Greece

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, European states hosting Syrians with refugee status have been debating next steps, with Germany and Austria immediately freezing asylum applications until further notice. What marks a historical moment for the country and its citizens has simultaneously launched a fresh wave of debates on migration policy. Even faster than these debates could spread, came the policy reactions: Many EU member states have sharpened migratory regulations, jeopardizing the protected legal status of tens of thousands of Syrians who have built lives abroad.

Many migration experts criticize these policy shifts as premature, citing the persisting political and economic instability in Syria as impeding the successful repatriation of citizens. As the government and its citizens rebuild in the wake of the decades-long regime, European solidarity plays a crucial role in this transition. Without implementing intermediate solutions and clear information from state actors, the decision to halt protected status creates further uncertainty for Syrian nationals. To analyze the current shifts in European migration response and the concrete impact this has on Syrian nationals abroad, the Project Elpida Team came into conversation with Samos-based legal worker, Réka Rebeka Rósa, to establish a clearer understanding of policy implications and the ever-challenging situation on the ground for migrants. 

A New Government in Syria: What Now?

By freezing the asylum applications of Syrian nationals, European states have introduced a new level of uncertainty for those who hold refugee status or subsidiary protection, including individuals with pending asylum claims. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, EU law allows governments to revoke, end or refuse to renew their status if the reason to offer protection has ceased. While no plans for mass repatriation currently exist, many countries have interpreted the fall of the Assad regime as a basis for policy adjustments and reduced protections. 

Debates on next steps vary in levels of severity: From the introduction of “go-and-see” visits with the ability to re-enter resettlement countries - similar to what has been implemented with Ukrainian nationals - to threats of implementing programs of orderly return and deportation. While these imminent policy responses were fast, they did not come unexpected: Instead, they reveal a deeper logic of how migrants are being perceived socially and politically since the “crisis” began a decade ago: through a rhetoric of return. Policy moves such as the EU-Turkey Deal of 2016 and the New Migration Pact of 2024, which focus on relocation to third countries and defensive integration tactics, are political manifestos of  this logic and constitute clear examples of the continuous push to manage refugee flows outside of European borders. 

Syria’s current de facto government is interim, which means that  the country is still trying to consolidate control over territory that had been devastated and divided for more than a decade. Since the fall of Assad, nearly 1,500 civilians have been killed during clashes between Syrian security patrol and remaining armed pro-Assad loyalists who formed within factions of the country’s ethnic Alawite community. In a recent report by UNHCR, concerns over security, livelihoods, and basic services such as housing were cited as reasons for low repatriation rates, with about 90% of people in Syria living in poverty. In respect to voluntary returns, research suggests that Syrian refugees are motivated more by conditions in Syria than by policy decisions in host-countries. Current policy adjustments are not only insufficient incentives for Syrian nationals abroad, but also risk fostering new waves of displacement, with recent reports revealing that over 40,000 people have already been internally displaced following the regime’s collapse.   

Human Rights Experts Warn It’s Too Soon To Act

The drastic responses by European state actors have caused countless human rights organizations to advocate for more nuanced and sustainable solutions. According to a Middle East expert and senior policy adviser in the German Bundestag, decisions by European states to freeze applications is destabilizing for both Syrians and host countries. Presently, it increases insecurity of Syrians waiting for an asylum decision, creating stressful limbo situations for applicants. The European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) echoes this stance in its analysis of recent EU policy shifts, emphasizing the importance of the EU’s role in supporting transition in Syria while maintaining international protection in Europe. This requires a common EU framework on temporary visits to Syria for beneficiaries of international protection, as well as replacement protections for those with refugee status, such as subsidiary and national protection statuses or residence permits for work and studies. To reduce the risk of further displacement and insecurity, continuous monitoring of the situation is necessary, and the toppling of Assad alone does not render asylum claims void. 

Since the fall of the regime, many Syrians holding refugee status in EU countries have spoken out about how returning would mean an end to a new life they have risked everything to build. Adopting a rhetoric of return thus threatens   to destabilize the lives of those who have resettled in the EU, both politically and socially, subjecting those with pending asylum decisions to more instability and potential human rights violations. Currently, 9,500 Syrians await decisions in Greece, 7,300 in Austria, 6,500 in Britain, and in Germany alone 47,270. 

Conditions in the Camps Remain Catastrophic

To better understand the human impact of EU policy decisions, Project Elpida came into conversation  with Réka Rebeka Rósa, a legal expert for I Have Rights (IHR) on Samos in Greece. In addition to advocacy work, members of IHR provide camp inhabitants with legal information and advice. Working for the organization since 2022, Réka shares valuable insights into the current situation of asylum proceedings for people on the move. Our discussion centered around the situation for Syrian nationals currently residing in the Close Control Access Center (CCAC) on Samos. 

As opposed to focusing on the fall of the Assad-regime, our conversation began with the widely discussed “EU-Turkey Deal” which was extended in 2023 despite strong opposition by experts and activists alike. Réka explained that the agreement, which declared Türkiye a safe third-country, consistently impeded the asylum seeking process for  Syrian, Afghan, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Somali nationals. Any person from these countries entering Greece through Türkiye was subjected to a two-step interview process: first, to prove that Türkiye was not a safe country for them, and second to discuss the alleged  safety of their country of origin. 

“I mean, in practice”, remarked Réka, “Türkiye was never considered a safe third country.” What she and her co-workers witnessed when processing the cases of their clients was that “it was very, very difficult to seek international protection, and many people experienced deportation.” She elaborated that access to asylum was “very limited” and that “generally, the situation is definitely not meeting the legal requirements of a safe third country.” Procedurally, a return to Türkiye had remained almost impossible throughout, despite its official status as safe: “Basically, there was no way for people to be readmitted to Türkiye.” This legal limbo left many in extremely vulnerable situations, “without any kind of legal status”, Réka explained, “and in Greece, that could mean detention”. 

In October 2024, human rights experts and activists briefly celebrated a ruling by the EU Court of Justice which officially designated Türkiye as a non-safe third-country. While Réka and her coworkers welcomed the EU Court of Justice ruling, the recent ministerial decision in Greece threatens to reverse its implication for domestic policy: “The ministerial decision which was announced in the beginning of April emphasized that Türkiye could indeed be considered a safe third country, so we are quite confused.” She went on to clarify how the ministerial decision further muddled the waters in a situation already riddled with uncertainty: “After the Assad-regime fell, interviews still took place, but the asylums service told us they were not going to be issuing any decisions on them. What ended up happening was that our clients went to their scheduled interviews, and they were now asked about both Syria and Türkiye in one round. And then, they never received any decisions to our knowledge.” 

Consequently, the ministerial decision concerning Turkiye’s status led to an indefinite pause of interviews altogether. “Everybody is quite unsure about what is happening at the moment”, remarks Réka.  “We still try to provide information. But obviously, people are often frustrated, as we often can only tell them that we don’t know: we don’t know when there will be appointments for their asylum interview, we don’t know what the decisions eventually might be, and we don’t know when decision-making might resume as nothing has been communicated on official channels.” During this time of confusion, Réka explained how the asylum service info-point in the CCAC has been closing and re-opening on an irregular schedule for over the span of a year, due to a lack of interpreters and general capacities. 

She went on to describe the challenging environment that people are subjected to: “I think what is important to keep in mind over all of this, is that people are kept in very difficult conditions. On Samos, people have limited access to running water, the food is insufficient in quality and quantity, there is a severe lack in hygiene, and people have to deal with bedbugs, cockroaches, scabies, and many other health hazards.” While IHR workers are almost exclusively legal experts and mental health support is not included in their services, Réka emphasized that the declining mental health of her clients has not gone unnoticed by her and her coworkers. “Currently, there is no psychologist present in the CCAC”, she explained. At the moment, camp inhabitants who have to live in what Réka, and  a vast number of human rights advocates and experts - describe as “prison-like conditions”, have no access to state pointed mental health professionals in any capacity.

While Debates About Syrians’ Prospect of Return Rage, Humanity and Dignity in Europe’s Camps is Absent

While journalists, policy-makers, and public figures are debating whether Syrian nationals will want to return after the fall of the Assad-regime, Réka is under the impression that this discussion point is largely absent among CCAC inhabitants themselves. Similarly, she has not heard of people explicitly expressing a desire for “go-and-see” visits, as the main sentiment towards Syria continues to be riddled with worry over general safety. 

When asked if she believed explicit guidelines from EU-officials towards domestic civil servants in Greece and, most importantly, humanitarian care- and aid workers would be helpful, she seemed skeptical. “It would indeed be helpful to move forward, to better understand the current situation, but to be honest, we are speaking about an EU that is operating within the climate of the new EU Migration Pact.” What seems more important, Réka noted, is that the larger context should be re-examined to move towards a general direction of “treating people with dignity and humanity through the whole asylum seeking procedure”. The CCAC is a fitting reflection of the inhumane conditions Réka and many others have spoken about consistently in their advocacy. She expressed her disappointment that alarming reports detailing the poor treatment of unaccompanied children and minors have failed to garner wider attention: “I think it’s also important to flag that a lot of elements in the new Migration Pact have been taken out of the regulation that we see here on Samos, especially concerning the screening procedure. And unfortunately, we can clearly see how they do not work, and how they lead towards a direction where people end up having even less rights than before.”

To conclude, we asked Réka for closing comments she wished to be mentioned explicitly in the article. Her answer was clear: Neither the conditions on Samos, nor the treatment of Syrian nationals, should be regarded as isolated incidents. What we have been discussing in this interview, she reminded us, is just one symptom of a larger issue regarding the general situation of migrants and refugees in the EU. As headlines and policymakers frame the futures of people on the move through a binary of “refugee” or “returnee”, it continues to prioritize a rhetoric of return over critical reflections on the ineffectiveness of migration structures themselves. Just as the fall of the Assad-regime marks not an end to the fight for a unified Syria, but a new beginning, it is necessary to continue monitoring and raising awareness on the lived experiences of migrants and refugees in the EU.